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Abstract
Minting persistent identifiers and managing their metadata is typically governed by a 
single organization. Such a single point of failure poses a risk to longevity and long-
term preservation of identifiers. In this paper we address the risk by proposing a 
radically different approach, in which minting and management of persistent identifiers 
is distributed, and the integrity of the distributed system is guaranteed by public-key 
cryptography. We describe the general architecture of the system, analyse its robustness 
and discuss potential deployment scenarios.
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Introduction
A proliferation of research artifacts in contemporary scholarly communication, in 
particular the publication of datasets and source code mandated by the principles of 
open science, has emphasized the need for minting and management of persistent 
identifiers. Traditional, centralized approaches guarantee persistence via trusted 
organizations with long-term commitment to identifier management. However, this 
model has inherent risks, as identifier persistence is dependent on the viability, 
solvency, and good will of the managing organizations, and their ability to survive 
political, economic and military turmoils. Even in favourable external conditions, the 
above risks have already materialized several times in the short history of the Internet 
(cf. shutting down of MyOpenID). Therefore, even the most technologically robust 
identifiers tend to have a single point of failure: their managing organization. A handful 
of initiatives were recently launched to address these challenges including w3id, which 
relies on a social contract between several managing organizations.
Goal
In this paper we propose a radically different, decentralized scheme for minting and 
management of persistent identifiers. We drew inspiration from two popular, distributed 
systems based on cryptography: Git for source code management and Bitcoin for online 
payments. Our goal is to design, implement and deploy a system with the following 
properties:
 Anyone can mint a persistent identifier and associate with it a URL to content 
and a list of keys authorized to manage the identifier;
 For a given persistent identifier, any authorized key owner (and no one else) can 
alter the URL and the list of authorized keys;
 Anyone can download the complete set of persistent identifiers with complete 
revision history and verify its integrity;
 No proper subset of participating people and organizations is capable of shutting 
down the system.
The focus of this work is, therefore, specifically on maintaining long-term 
resolvability of persistent identifiers. The system should be agnostic with respect to 
referent type (data sets, source codes, documents, people) and content delivery 
technology (HTTP, BitTorrent, Tor/Onion). Thus, the system adopts the PID paradigm 
(Van de Sompel et al., 2014) and will be ready for any future referent types and 
technologies.
Method
To achieve our goal, we propose Peer-Minted Persistent Identifier (PMPI) system that 
makes extensive use of public-key cryptography and peer-to-peer network 
communication. For the sake of exposition, we will present here a slightly simplified 
description of the system.
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The key notion in the system is an operation (such as a mint or update) on an 
identifier. Each operation contains the following essential fields:
 An operation identifier (a hash of all the other fields),
 A persistent identifier (a UUID),
 A URL to content,
 A list of public keys of entities authorized to manage the identifier,
 An identifier of the preceding operation,
 The digital signature of the authorized person or organization executing the 
operation,
 A proof of work (cryptographic nonce).
Each operation (save for the root) has a predecessor, and the majority of the 
operations in the system form a chain (see Figure 1), while occasional “orphaned” 
operations will exist outside the main chain due to failed concurrent modifications. An 
operation can be added to the chain if it is valid, which means in particular that the 
digital signature is correct and the private key used for signing is authorized to manage 
the identifier (i.e., the most recent operation in the chain related to the persistent 
identifier features the corresponding public key), etc.
Figure 1. A chain of operations on persistent identifiers.
The proof of work is a solution to a cryptographic puzzle. The executor of the 
operation has to invest a moderate amount of CPU time to solve the puzzle and come up 
with a valid operation. This serves several important purposes: it helps to sequence 
operations performed concurrently, and reduces incentives for spamming and flooding 
attacks. Entities that minted a significant number of identifiers (and therefore invested 
significant computational power) have a higher “reputation” and are given easier 
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puzzles, thus facilitating bulk operations by registrars and large libraries. More 
precisely, a trusted user can put several operations in a single block added to the chain, 
while producing a single proof-of-work. The more trusted a user, the more operations 
they may put in a block.
Certain decisions in the system should be taken collectively, rather than by 
individual users. For example, when a given key is consistently used for spamming or 
other malicious activity, the community may choose to blacklist the key. Or, when the 
only user authorised to control a certain set of identifiers loses their private key, the 
community may collectively allow them to reclaim control over the orphaned 
identifiers. In both of these examples a certain level of consensus should be required in 
order to perform a globally-beneficial action. Therefore, in order to facilitate collective 
decision-making, another type of operations is added to the system (these operations are 
chained and signed just like any other operation): votes supporting certain well-defined 
types of notions.
PMPI incorporates a system of roles. Users authorised to act on a given identifier 
may be given different access rights, for example an organization providing metadata 
curation services may be authorized to change the checksum of the referent, but cannot 
modify the list of authorised keys.
PMPI has a peer-to-peer architecture (see Figure 2). Each node in the system keeps 
the complete set of operations. A new operation (such as minting an identifier) is created 
by linking to the most recent operation in the main chain. Immediately after a proof of 
work is found, the operation is broadcast to the network. Each receiving node verifies 
the operation and stores it. This way, the entire system can be restored from a single 
node, and any kind of tampering with any operation in the chain can be easily 
discovered (e.g. digital signatures will not match, or the operation identifier will not 
match the one stored in its successor).
Figure 2. Information flow in P2P network.
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Properties
The proposed system follows the LOCKSS (Lots of Copies Keep Stuff Safe) way of 
providing long-term preservation. Each node in the system contains its entire state, 
which incurs only modest space requirements (back-of-the-envelope estimation: 500 
million identifiers with two operations per identifier on average and 400 bytes per 
operation means 400 GB of storage needed).
PMPI is transparent and secure: anyone can read the entire revision history of any 
persistent identifier, and anyone can verify the integrity of the entire chain of operations, 
as verifying proofs of work and digital signatures is cheap.
Business Models
For-profit and non-profit organizations may offer a range of services based on PMPI, 
from minting identifiers (thus monetizing their good reputation in the system), to 
maintaining the resolvability of identifiers (as part of their data stewardship services), to 
offering backup access (providing insurance against the loss of a private key), to 
providing metadata curation services on top of minting persistent identifiers.
Resilience to Attacks
The system is designed with security in mind, including the ability to withstand 
foreseeable types of malicious attacks is a priority.
One of the foreseeable vectors of attack is a denial of service caused by flooding the 
system with operations (e.g. minting new identifiers or acting on existing ones). As each 
operation is stored by all the nodes in the system, the machines would eventually run 
out of disk space. Such an attack is fortunately infeasible thanks to the proof-of-work: it 
takes too much more time for the adversary to mint a new identifier.
Even if an entire botnet were employed to disrupt the system, it could only succeed 
by first generating a single high reputation key and thus being able to execute bulk 
operations. This key, however, would be blacklisted (nodes would stop accepting 
operations executed using the key) and the computational power of the botnet would be 
wasted. Coordination of the blacklisting would have to be done outside the protocol 
(e.g. via a mailing list of PMPI operators), but on the other hand the attack itself seems 
to be extremely unlikely, given the amount of investment necessary and the lack of 
benefit.
Access Control
As in any system based on public-key cryptography, losing one’s private keys can have 
very negative consequences. Fortunately, there are mechanisms in PMPI that mitigate 
the risk of losing access to one’s identifiers. First of all, one can authorize another key 
owner (one’s organization, or some trusted third-party organization) to co-manage a 
given set of identifiers. The protocol also gives the community access to abandoned 
identifiers.
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Interoperability
PMPI is not intended to eliminate the existing minting organizations, as many of them 
provide additional services that are not provided by our system (for instance, handling 
and curating metadata). Instead, we seek to provide an interoperability mechanism 
through which the end users will be able to migrate from one provider to another, while 
retaining the same persistent identifier. Those who choose to do so, will be able to mint 
and manage identifiers on their own, others will be able to delegate specific concerns to 
the service providers of their choice.
Related Work
No solution known to us shares the goals and characteristics of PMPI. Existing 
persistent identifier solutions obviously share the goals of PMPI, but are not distributed, 
and therefore long-term preservation of identifiers is dependent on the viability and 
goodwill of managing organizations. However, there are several solutions with different 
goals, but similar approaches (distributed, based on public-key cryptography and 
Merkle trees). A careful reader might ask: “Why not take solution X and use it for our 
benefit?” Let us answer this question for several most likely values of X.
Namecoin
Namecoin1 is a direct fork of Bitcoin2, with a goal of resisting online censorship. It is a 
“decentralized open source information registration and transfer system”. However, 
while Namecoin focuses on fighting censorship, PMPI puts more emphasis on long-
term preservation aspects: recoverability of identifiers, access control and delegation. 
There are further differences between PMPI and Namecoin that are not specific to the 
latter and apply to all Bitcoin-based solutions.
Permacoin
Permacoin (Miller et al., 2014) aims at repurposing Bitcoin’s proof-of-work for data 
preservation. It is geared towards larger pieces of information that are to be stored in a 
distributed manner. So-called proofs-of-retrievability are used to check whether users 
really do store fragments of the public data set. PMPI, in contrast, deals with many 
small and mutable pieces of information and has more fine-grained access control 
mechanisms.
Bitcoin
Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008; Decker and Wattenhofer, 2013) is the most popular digital 
cryptocurrency, and as of early 2015 its market capitalization is in the order of billions 
of U.S. dollars. Bitcoin was one of the inspirations for PMPI, but there are several 
important differences between the two. In contrast to Bitcoin-based systems, PMPI does 
support bulk minting operations, by loosening the requirement of presenting proofs-
of-work in the case of reputable key owners. More broadly, the primary purpose of a 
proof-of-work in Bitcoin-based systems is to generate a digital currency (which is 
convertible to U.S. dollars), while PMPI decouples financial aspects of minting from 
1 Namecoin: http://namecoin.info/
2 Bitcoin: https://bitcoin.org/en/ 
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technical ones. In other words, PMPI guarantees security and integrity of minting, but 
does not impose any particular business model.
Furthermore, while Bitcoin and its forks support “compressing” blocks of old 
operations, in PMPI the variable size of blocks serves one additional purpose: it rewards 
reputable users, making it easier for them to perform bulk operations. Moving on, 
neither Bitcoin nor its forks support collective decision-making (blacklisting known 
offenders, recovering from loss of private keys). Finally, PMPI facilitates delegation of 
concerns (different key owners may have different rights with respect to the same 
identifier).
Conclusions
We propose a system for the minting and management of persistent identifiers, in which 
long-term preservation of information is no longer dependent on any single 
organization, but instead on the existence of many publicly available copies. By default, 
identifier owners have complete administrative control by means of public-key 
cryptography, but can delegate that control to for-profit or non-profit organizations. 
Therefore, the proposed system increases transparency and public access to information 
about identifiers, while retaining viable business models for registrars.
Current Status and Next Steps
PMPI is a well-studied idea for a persistent identifier system, with a lot of effort put into 
guaranteeing its security, scalability and robustness. We plan to identify and gather 
stakeholders interested in developing a concrete protocol for PMPI. Our primary focus 
will be on scholarly communication and the various types of entities commonly 
referenced there, such as documents, data sets, source codes, people and organizations. 
Together with a protocol, we plan to develop a reference implementation of P2P 
software for the distributed management of persistent identifiers.
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